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Abstract 
The paper considers the conditions governing the diffusion and development of e-
commerce.  The analysis builds on earlier discussions of technological successions 
and explores a number of factors, not normally considered, which are likely to have a 
bearing on the probability of e-commerce IS technologies displacing traditional IS 
technologies.  The first factor is differentiation of the characteristic sets offered by 
the old and new technologies, and contrast this with higher performance 
specifications over the same set of characteristics.  Second, we consider differential 
costs due to scale economies.  Differential falling unit costs of alternative information 
systems (IS) affect demand when these are transmitted to prices, altering the price-
quality combinations offered by old and new IS technology providers.  Third, we 
consider time as a possible explanatory variable.  Altering the time in which new IS 
technology providers are able to exploit their superior applications is likely to affect 
the probability of a technological succession occurring.  Analysis is conducted via 
simulation techniques on an agent-based model that contain heterogeneous 
populations of adaptive users and providers who co-evolve over time. 
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1. Introduction: technological successions and punctuated equilibrium 
Schumpeter laid stress on the importance of technological discontinuities in 
economic history.  In contrast to Marshall, who on the front page of his ‘Principles of 
Economics’ stated that Natura non facit saltum (Nature does not leap), Schumpeter 
argued that “evolution is lopsided, discontinuous, disharmonious by nature... studded 
with violent outbursts and catastrophes... more like a series of explosions than a 
gentle, though incessant, transformation” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 102).  Schumpeter 
did not question the existence of long periods of gradual development marked by the 
incremental development of established technologies.  However, he stressed that 
such periods are punctuated by short bursts in which radically new technologies – 
such as the steam engine, the dynamo, the internal combustion engine and the 
integrated circuit - yield alternative products, processes and associated knowledges 
that displace existing technologies and lead to key structural changes in the economy 
as old industries are displaced by new industries, and old employment patterns 
replaced by new ones.  It is the appearance of these new major technological 
breakthroughs that drive the economic system in a new direction.  Such a shift “so 
displaces its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one 
by infinitesimal steps.  Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you 
will never get a railway thereby”  (Schumpeter, 1939, p.37).  
 
We suggest that the concept of punctuated equilibrium developed in the ecological 
sciences can be usefully applied to this discussion of the relationship between 
incremental change and technological successions.  The ecological theory of 
punctuated equilibrium was originally put forward by Gould and Eldridge (1977).  
They observe that “once they appear, species tend not to change very much at all.  
They may last 5 or 10 million years - sometimes even longer - and yet, while a few 
might undergo the sort of gradual, ‘progressive’ modification we have come to 
expect of evolution, most will stay pretty much as they were when they first 
evolved... But the mid-Paleozoic period shows us that the individual instances of 
species-stability ‘punctuated’ by occasional bursts of speciation... have immediate 
consequences for the ecological organisation, and thus the ecological history, of life” 
(Eldridge, 1987, p.82).  In their discussion of species succession in ecological 
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systems, Nicolis and Prigogine (1977) add that the new invaders must have a better 
capability of exploiting the same resources offered within an ecological niche.  In 
other words, they must be able to do something ‘more’ or ‘better’ - whether it be 
capturing a certain type of prey, reproducing or avoiding death - than the previous 
incumbent.  As a consequence, the fitness of successive species occupying a given 
niche will increase over time.  The envelope of overall fitness is raised as more 
efficient species displace earlier incumbents within an ecological niche (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Succession by species of increasing fitness 
Schumpeter’s discussion of economic evolution has much in common with the 
ecological theory subsequently developed by Gould and Eldridge.  As noted, 
Schumpeter similarly discussed economic history in terms of punctuated equilibrium, 
the economic system spending long periods in one equilibrium state and then 
suddenly shifting to a new equilibrium.  Economic history, according to Schumpeter, 
is marked by a sequence of such punctuations brought on by the development of 
radically new technological products, processes and associated knowledges.  We 
suggest that punctuated equilibrium offers a useful general framework in which to 
bring together the discussions of radical and incremental technological innovation 
developed over the last couple of decades.  Product competition can operate at two 
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levels, between rival old and new technological artefacts and between rival variants 
of a technological artefact.  In the remainder of this paper we shall address the 
conditions under which the advantages that have accrued to an established 
technology over time may be overcome by a new, alternative technology. 
2. Technological successions in e-commerce 
Turning to the diffusion of e-commerce IS technologies, we see that these are being 
applied to two rather different generic types of commercial activity: firm-to-
household transactions (B2C) and inter-firm transactions (B2B).  While accurate 
figures are notoriously difficult to come by, due to their commercial sensitivity, the 
bulk of activity thus far appears to be in B2B transactions.  Forrester Consultancy 
estimated that a total value of $51 billion was traded electronically in the USA in 
1998.  Within this figure, B2B dwarfed B2C trade with $43bn of the total due to B2B 
trade.  Forrester predicted this will double every year up to 2003, rising to $1.3 
trillion.  By contrast, B2C trade was predicted to rise to $108 billion (9.4% of B2B 
trade) up to 2003 (Bell, 1998).   
How are we to understand the different diffusion dynamics in these two niches?  A 
key issue, we suggest, is whether e-commerce technologies are being supported by 
new user groups that are using the technology to explore new types of preferences, or 
whether the technologies are being supported by established user groups whose 
preferences were formed through the use of older technologies.  The evolution of 
consumer preferences is a particularly underdeveloped area within economics.  Two 
of the current authors have emphasised the need to focus on demand side factors in 
order to understand the complex dynamics involved in emergent market structures 
(Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998).  In the context of technological successions for 
radically new technology products, we suggest that the appearance of a new 
consumer group or ‘type’ that gives weight to the particular characteristics offered by 
a new technology is likely to be a necessary condition for a technological succession.  
Ongoing discussions about the development of distinct forms of youth culture on the 
Internet are of interest here.   The Internet facilitates the (virtual) interaction of 
readers and writers in ways that are very difficult to achieve in print – especially for 
young people.  Publishing on the Web by this age group is motivated by the desire to 
participate in, or create, a distinct community (Abbott, 1998).  Computer-culture 
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theorists such as Turkle (1995) go further, seeing in the new uses of computers 
“fundamental shifts in the way we create and experience human identity” (1995, 
p.10).  Cyberculture, she argues, is distinct to other forms of culture and populated 
with distinctive species of human beings - hackers, MUDers and cyberpunks.   
An important factor explaining the rapid diffusion of B2B IS technologies lies in 
their being substitutes that replace well-established EDI1 technologies without 
altering the business-to-business practices or conventions fostered under these older 
technologies.  There is a history of electronic trading in supply chains and the 
concept is not unfamiliar to firms.  The shift in this area is from a set of proprietary 
EDI systems to a common, open IS standard that is based on TCP/IP (Internet) 
protocols.  Diffusion is not associated with the emergence of new user types.  We 
shall henceforth refer to this type of displacement as a ‘partial succession’.  By 
contrast, internet-based IS applications in B2C aim to support the development of 
radically new consumer products/services.  This implies new business models that go 
way beyond household consumers ordering products over the Internet.  Indeed the 
‘promise’ of e-commerce is that every facet of business - from procurement, to 
billing, to human resources, to customer support – will be integrated within one 
system, fundamentally changing how consumers, small businesses and major 
corporations interact commercially.  Diffusion in B2C is simultaneously associated 
with experiments by users who are exploring new types of preferences.  If successful, 
diffusion of the new technology will be associated by a new product-user group 
coupling.  Henceforth we shall refer to this type of displacement as a ‘full 
succession’.   
In addition to the emergence of new user groups, we shall explore three factors that 
are likely affect the probability of e-commerce IS technologies displacing traditional 
IS technologies.  The first factor is differentiation of the characteristic sets offered by 
the old and new technologies, and contrast this with higher performance 
specifications over the same set of characteristics.  The second factor we shall 
consider is differential costs due to scale economies.  The third factor we consider is 
time.  Altering the time in which new IS technology providers are able to exploit their 
superior applications is likely to affect the probability of a technological succession 
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occurring.  Given the large number of parameters involved in the analysis, and the 
desire to examine these in a meaningful manner, we employ simulation techniques 
on an agent-based model that contain heterogeneous populations of adaptive users 
and providers who co-evolve over time.  The model is a hybrid Neo-Schumpeterian – 
New-Keynesian model.  Providers employ various adjustment rules to their 
production routines, while simultaneously innovating in their IS systems through a 
combination of imitation (selective transfer) and internal R&D (selective mutation).  
The model contains an imperfect capital market, with investment financed from a 
provider’s stock of wealth.  Providers use a mark-up pricing rule and market prices 
are ‘sticky’: providers do not adjust to excess demands and the market does not 
necessarily clear in a single period. The simulation analysis is conducted through a 
statistical estimation of a set of logit models. 
 
3. Conditions for a technological succession 
An important starting point is Shy’s (1996) discussion of consumer substitution 
between network size and quality in sequential technology competitions.  In contrast 
to earlier papers by Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1986), the 
overlapping generations (OLG) model developed by Shy focuses on repeated 
technology adoptions.  The model allows for different preferences between the ‘old’ 
consumer type and the ‘young’ consumer type, although preferences within each 
generation are assumed to be identical (i.e. homogeneous).  The key question 
addressed by the model is whether the young consumer type will treat quality and 
installed user networks as substitutes and, hence, select the later technology (which is 
de facto assumed to be of higher quality) or alternatively treat them as complements, 
in which case they will select the old technology.  In this paper we address a number 
of issues that are ‘black boxed’ by Shy but which are likely to have important 
implications for the general thrust of his argument.   
A number of considerations can be identified in this respect.  The first is functional 
equivalence.  A technological succession involves the substitution of an established 
product or process by a new alternative that fulfils the same basic function  (Grübler 
                                                                                                                                          
1  EDI is the computerised inter-firm communication of trade documents in a standard format that 
permits the automatic handling of transactions. 
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et al., 1988; Grübler, 1990).  Second, there is the quality of alternative designs.  The 
standard economics model of choice ties relative fitness to the welfare associated 
alternative commodities.  The economic literature contains some important 
precedents for an analytical treatment of how users first compare, and then rank, 
substitutable goods (e.g. Frenken, Saviotti and Trommetter, 1999).  A third 
consideration is the trade-off between quality and price.  A trade-off is likely to exist 
between the quality of the rival technologies and their price, tied to costs of 
producing these alternative bundles of characteristics.  Given that user welfare 
depends on both the relative performance of each IS technology and their prices, this 
will affect demand and hence the outcome of a technological competition (Arthur, 
Ermoliev and Kaniovski,1987; Arthur, 1989).  The fourth consideration we address 
is the existence of new types of users.  As noted in section 2, this is likely to be a key 
factor affecting the complex dynamics of emergent market structures.   
3.1 The adopter’s choice problem 
From the proceeding discussion we see that there is likely to be a number of factors 
influencing user preferences, and that these interact in a complex manner.  Three 
factors in particular were highlighted above: production costs, price and performance 
quality.  Formalising this, the probability of adopting the new IS technology B rather 
than the established IS technology A at time t is  
 
{ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }BBBAAA pmxUpmxU -+<-+ BA VVPr  (1) 
where  x is the characteristic vector of an IS technology design  
p is the price of that design 
V is the indirect utility of money that can be obtained in other markets 
Here we assume that all other markets are fixed and that this function has a constant 
form.  U(x) is the direct utility of consuming the good with characteristic vector x.  
Note that the utility of not buying a good is V(m) and so a user will only accept offer 
(x, p) if  ui(x) > Vi(m) - Vi(m-pi).  That is to say, an adopter only makes a purchase 
when direct utility outweighs the loss in indirect utility (i.e. the opportunity cost) of 
the purchase.  
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In the presence of heterogeneous preferences, a simple analytically tractable solution 
for equation (1) is unlikely to exist in all but the simplest of circumstances.  Multiple 
equilibria solutions may exist in which it is impossible to predict ex ante whether 
there will be a technological succession, a technological lock-out, or a mixed 
solution (i.e. a partial succession with market sharing between the old and new 
technologies).  First, multiple equilibria solutions can exist - even when the 
performance characteristics of one IS technology application are absolutely superior 
to those of another - if there is a high frequency of intermediate valuations within the 
user population.  Second, rival technologies typically offer different relative 
strengths across a set of performance characteristics.  Again, given heterogeneous 
preferences, it is impossible to predict ex ante whether a technological succession 
will occur.  One way of tackling the problem is to construct a simulation model in 
order to analyse the consequences of heterogeneous user preferences, and the co-
evolutionary dynamics of changing user preferences and the innovative activities of 
competing providers.  
4. A formal model of IS successions  
After initialisation, overall control of the model passes to a market ‘object’ that runs 
the model for the number of time periods specified in the model configuration.  In 
each period this market object proceeds as follows, 
 
i. It brings the user groups to market in a random order and gets the groups 
to determine their demands and purchases. 
ii. It initiates the replicator dynamic for that period to redistribute the user 
population across the groups. 
iii. It gets providers to adjust their capacity, level of production and to 
redesign their goods. 
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4.1 User dynamics 
There are M user groups.  Associated with group i = 1,.., M, a utility function ui is 
defined over the offer space, namely the Cartesian product X´P of design space X 
and the price space P (positive real numbers) of the form 
 
Ui(x,p) = åk aikvk(xk) + biw(m-p) = ai×v(x) + biw(m-p) (2) 
 
Here m is the budget of the user and is assumed to be the same for all users.  The 
term b iw(m-p) is the indirect utility obtained by spending the residual budget in other 
markets.  All users in the same group are assumed to adopt the same utility function.  
Each provider offers to sell a good with some design x at some price p.  Users use 
these utility functions to rank alternative offers and as a measure of well-being.  Note 
that users always have the option of not accepting any of the offers and may keep all 
of their budget for use elsewhere.  The utility of this option is b iw(m) and will be 
called the null utility.  It can be seen that the utility functions differ across groups 
only in having different values for the coefficients ai and b i.  Currently we use a 
simple square root function for the component functions, i.e.  
vk(xk) = Öxk   and    w(m-p) = Ö(m-p)  (3) 
The population of users in each period is G and a form of the replicator dynamics 
described below governs the distribution across the M groups.  Let Git be the number 
of users of type i at time t.  We use the subscript t only when necessary to distinguish 
between periods.  In each period provider j offers a quantity Qj of a particular design-
price combination (xj, pj).  After providers have ‘posted’ these offers, user groups 
appear in the market in a random order.  Let I(i), with i=1,.., M, be a permutation of 
the indices {1,.., M} so that I(1) is the first group to come to market.  Note that this 
permutation will differ from period to period.  Given the utility function UI(1) 
associated with this group, the users rank the offers (xj, pj) in descending order of 
preference.  
Let J(j) j = 0,1,.., M represent this ranking, so that J(j) is a permutation of {0, 1,.., 
M}, where 0 represents the ‘null offer’,  i.e. buy none of the goods.  If the null offer 
is best (i.e. J(0) = 0) the users in that group exit the market without buying anything.  
If the provider ranked highest by the users has an offer which dominates the null 
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offer (i.e. J(0) > 0) then all users in that group will ‘post’ a demand for one unit of 
that offer.  If provider J(0) has produced a sufficient quantity of the good (i.e. QJ(0) ³ 
GI(1)) then all these demands will be converted into sales, all users in the group exit 
the market and the available quantity of the good is reduced by the volume of sales, 
i.e. QJ(0) Ü QJ(0) - GI(1) ( where  Ü indicates assignment of the right-hand value to 
the left-hand value). 
If demand exceeds supply (i.e. QJ(0) < GI(1)) then QJ(0) demands are converted into 
sales, QJ(0) of the user leave the market and the available quantity of the good 
becomes zero and the remaining users G1 - QJ(0) consider their next best option J(1).  
The interaction of these remaining users with this offer is identical to interaction with 
J(0). If J(1) = 0 they leave the market, otherwise they post demands for the goods and 
these are met fully or partly depending on the quantity QJ(1) on offer.  This process 
for group I(1) continues until all users in the group have left the market.  Group I(2) 
enters the market and interacts with providers in the same way apart from the fact 
that the quantities available to this group will be reduced by any sales made to group 
I(1) users.  This continues until all groups have entered and left the market.  When 
group I(i), i > 1, enters the market the quantities available will be the Qj’s minus any 
sales made to user groups I(k) for k=1,.., i-1. 
After this process in period t each user group will have attained an average level of 
utility Wit.  This is the average utility of the users in the group after they have 
consumed any good bought in this market.  Note that all users will attain a utility no 
less than the null utility and thus Wit will be no less than the null utility.  
Let 
G
Git
it =r , where G is the total population, be the proportion of the user 
population in the ith group.  Given these utilities the new distribution rit+1 is 
calculated as 
å
=+
k ktkt
itit
it rW
rW
r
r
r 1
   (4)  
where r is the factor determining the strength of the replicator effect of the differing 
utilities.  Groups with above-average utilities grow larger and groups with below-
average utility decline i.e. they have a negative grow rate. 
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4.2 Providers: prices, profits, wealth, production and capacity  
Here we present a model of production that is distinctly Keynesian in flavour as 
adjustments to excess demand occur primarily through changes in output and 
production capacity rather than price.  In the beginning of period t, provider j has 
monetary wealth Mjt, capacity or capital Kjt, design xjt, a level of production yjt and an 
inventory of unsold goods qjt.  The unit variable cost of production is given by the 
cost function 
 
C(x) = Sk gk ck(xk)  (5) 
 
Note that the cost function is common to all providers and is seen to represent the 
available technology available to all providers.  Note also that this cost is 
independent of the level of production.  The cost function is available to providers in 
the sense that they can calculate the cost of a design prior to production.  Currently 
the component functions are 
ck(xk) = xk2  (6) 
 
It is assumed providers face a fixed cost F so that the average total cost of producing 
output y of design x is 
y
xC f=)( .  Hence with F > 0 there are increasing returns to 
scale in the sense that these average total costs are falling. 
Providers set prices according to a simple mark up rule, namely  
 
( ) ÷÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
++=
jt
jtjtjt y
xC
f
hr )(1   (7)  
In current simulations there is a common and constant mark up so that hit = h, but the 
model allows the mark up to adjust to excess demands and supplies.  
At the start of the model, providers start with the same capacity and wealth but have 
their designs are randomly and independently generated.  The variety between 
providers is initially in their designs and in their target user group; see the discussion 
of innovation below.  
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Given the design and level of production the provider offers a quantity yjt + qjt of the 
design xjt at a price pjt.  After users have made their choices, signalled their demands 
and made their purchases, providers adjust their capacities, their levels of production 
and consider modifications to their designs.  
Given its sales sjt and level of production, each provider calculates its net revenue for 
the period, namely Pjt = pjtsjt - yjt C(xjt) - F.  This profit is added to its monetary 
wealth: Mjt+1 = Mjt + Pjt.  If profit is negative and this monetary wealth becomes 
negative, then the provider has to sell capital sufficient stock to return monetary 
wealth to zero.  If the provider has insufficient capital stock to restore zero monetary 
wealth then it becomes bankrupt in the sense that wealth and capital go to zero and 
the provider can no longer produce.  
The provider calculates a new target level of production y*jt+1 as follows: 
 
y*jt+1 = cdjt + (1 - c) sjt  (8) 
where c Î [0,1] is partial adjustment term and djt is the level of demand for the jth 
provider’s design in period t.  The provider adjusts its capacity given this target level 
of output.  Essentially, the provider aims to make capacity match this target level of 
output subject to the constraints that any increase in capacity cannot exceed its 
monetary wealth and that capacity cannot be negative.  Given this target capacity, the 
provider partially adjusts its capacity toward this target, 
Kjt+1 = Kjt + d(K*jt+1 - Kjt) (9) 
where d is a partial adjustment term and K*jt+1 is the target level of capacity.  K*jt+1 = 
y*jt+1 if (y*jt+1 - Kjt) £ Mjt+1 otherwise K*jt+1 = Kjt + Mjt+1.  
 
Note that, after adjusting capacity, monetary wealth is adjusted as follows: 
 
Mjt+1 = Mjt - (Kjt+1 - Kjt)  (10) 
 
4.3 Providers: Innovation 
Providers modify their designs in two stages.  In the first stage all providers consider 
mutations, while in the second stage all providers consider one-way transfers.  Both 
are subject to filtering by providers’ mental models.  Each provider targets one of the 
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user types.  In this version of the model we simplify by assuming the provider knows 
the utility function of that user type.  An innovation, mutation or transfer, is 
implemented only if it increases the utility of the target user type.  
Mutations are carried out in isolation of other providers.  Given design x for the jth 
provider at period t, the provider considers a mutated design x*.  Each component x*i 
mutates with probability m and if it does mutate it has the value xi + ke, where k is a 
mutation factor and e is a random number drawn from a standard normal distribution.  
The mutated design replaces the current design only if it increases the utility of the 
provider’s target user type.  
After mutation, providers consider further innovation based on imitation of rival 
providers.  Each provider picks another provider in a biased random draw from the 
existing set of providers.  This selection is biased toward to the more profitable 
providers.  In fact it is based on Goldberg’s ‘roulette wheel’ in that the probability of 
provider j being selected is proportional to the profit made by the provider j in the 
current period.  Having selected a rival, the provider creates a new candidate design 
x* by transferring part of the rival's design xr to replace the matching elements of its 
current design.  A random set H of characteristics is selected, as shown: 
 
x*h = xrh for h Î H and x*h = xh for h ÏH. (11) 
 
This selective transfer operator is different to crossover in genetic algorithms.  Here 
there is no mutual exchange of elements, selective transfer is a one-way emulation.  
Hence the provider that is being emulated does not have to adjust its design as a 
consequence of this operator.  The new design x* replaces the current design x only 
if this increases the utility of the target user type.  
4.4 Technological Shock 
In the current model there is a technological shock at period T1.  This shock has three 
features.  First, the IS characteristic space qualitatively changes, i.e. the set of 
characteristics associated with the new IS technology application differs from that of 
the old technology.  More specifically, prior to time T1, the IS characteristic space 
has characteristics dimensions 1 to h1.  After T1, the IS characteristic has dimensions 
h2 to h, where 1 £ h2 £ h1 < h.  Furthermore, before T1 there is a limit xmax on 
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characteristic values.  We use D1 and D2 to represent the design spaces before and 
after T1 respectively.  Before T1 all designs must belong to D1 and users place 
positive weight on IS application characteristics 1 to h1 and zero weights on 
characteristics h1+1 to h. 
Second, whereas providers prior to T1 are producers of the old technology, after T1 
all market entrants are ‘new’ IS technology producers.  At the same time, the user 
groups that emerge after T1 are ‘new’ technology users.  New generations of users 
and providers are generated in the following way; at T1 ‘dead’ providers and ‘dead’ 
user types are replaced by new generations of providers and user types.  A provider 
is treated as ‘dead’ if its market share has fallen below a cut-off value and a user type 
is ‘dead’ if its share of the user population has fallen below a cut-off value.  The new 
providers created at time T1 must provide designs in D2.  New user types place 
positive weight on IS application characteristics h2 to h and zero weight on 
characteristics 1 to h1-1.  Third, picking up on the earlier discussion of the possible 
importance of the relative rate of falling unit costs due to static and dynamic 
economies of scale, the cost of production for new technologies is reduced by a 
factor q, i.e. after T1 all gk are reduced by a factor q. 
4.5 Implementation details 
The current model uses three independent random number generators, RC, RF and 
RM, which are used to initialise and modify the users, providers and the market 
respectively.  These are independent in the sense that each has its own set of seeds.  
In a run of the model these generators are used as follows, 
i. RC is used to assign values for parameters a, b in the utility functions both at the 
start of the model and for new user groups at T1.  All values lie between 0.0 and 
1.0.  
ii.  RF is used to assign initial designs and cost parameters gk as well as control the 
mutations and transfers.  Apart from initial designs before T1 all values lie 
between 0.0 and 1.0. Initial designs before T1 are truncated at xmax. 
iii.  RM is used to randomly shuffle the order in which user groups arrive at the 
market.  
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A batch job is used to control multiple runs of the model.  This batch job has its own 
random number generator RB.   
5. Results 
The first step is to establish whether the model is capable of producing technological 
successions, illustrated in Figure 1 above.  In the tests conducted it is found that the 
model does indeed produce the patterns are associated with technological 
successions within a market niche.  As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the envelope of 
aggregate utility is raised as the new IS technology displaces the old technology in 
the market niche.  A succession occurs when a new, ‘fitter’ technology (i.e. one 
offering higher levels of welfare) displaces an older, ‘less fit’ technology (i.e. one 
offering lower levels of welfare).  
Successions are found to occur under a number of different circumstances.  As the 
model is rich in terms of parameters, we report a series of experiments that explore 
the dimensions of application characteristics h1, the upper bound on the values of 
characteristics offered by the old IS technology application xmax, time T1, and the cost 
reduction factor q as potential explanatory variables for a technological succession 
occurring. To this end, we constructed a logit model of the probability of succession 
P.  To estimate the models we take the 400 simulations as observations on the model. 
 
 
Figure 2. Succession by a new IS technology providing higher welfare 
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In order to discuss scenarios under which there is a shift to B2B or, alternatively, 
B2C outcomes we need to distinguish between what the ‘full succession’ and the 
‘partial succession’ categories discussed in section 2.  A ‘full succession’ occurs 
when, at the end of a simulation run, a Two provider-user coupling has displaced a 
Type One provider-user coupling, i.e. only new IS technology providers remain and 
these sell all their output to new user types.  By contrast, a partial succession occurs 
when Type Two providers displace Type One providers but sell their output to Type 
One users or a combination of Type One and Type Two users.  For each simulation 
we can use the observed values of sales and user population to classify the outcome 
as ‘full succession’, ‘partial succession’ or ‘no succession’ (Table 1). 
 
 
Summary Statistics Value 
In Sample Full Successions 111 
In Sample Partial Successions  160 
In Sample Total 360 
Out of Sample Full Succession 16 
Out of Sample Partial Successions  21 
Out of Sample Total  40 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics for occurrence of full and partial successions 
 
Here we present the logit model that considers the factors influencing a full 
succession.  The model sets the dependent variable to one if there is full succession 
and to zero otherwise.  When estimating the model we used 360 ‘in sample’ 
observations to select and estimate the models and 40 ‘out of sample’ observations to 
test the prediction capacity of the selected logit model.  Before selecting variables 
and estimating model the explanatory variables are normalised as follows.  For each 
variable we subtract the in-sample mean and divide by the in-sample standard 
deviation. Variable selection involves a stepwise elimination of variables in an 
attempt to minimise SIC (Schwartz Information Criterion) which is a form of 
Penalised Maximum Likelihood Model Selection (PMLMS) (Birchenhall et al., 
1999). Sin and White (1996) show that PMLMS leads asymptotically to the selection 
of the ‘best’ model, i.e. the model with the smallest Kullback-Liebler Distance from 
the true model even if all models are mis-specified.  
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Using this method of variable selection for the full succession model, the variables 
are eliminated in the following order: q, xmax, T1 and h1. The best model includes T1 
and h1, the estimated model being (Table 2). 
 
P = logit( 1.01 + 0.82 h1 + 0.72 T1 ) . 
 
 
Summary Statistics  Value 
SIC 383.9 
Log Likelihood 180.2 
In Sample Succession Errors  26%  
In Sample No Succession Errors 18% 
In Sample Total 21%  
Out of Sample Succession Errors 19%  
Out of Sample No Succession Errors 5% 
Out of Sample Total  12%  
 
Table 2.   Summary statistics for best fit model of full successions 
 
6. Conclusion 
The simulation model presented in this paper marks a first attempt to develop a 
systematic modelling of the probability of IS successions occurring in e-commerce.  
What is more, we are able to distinguish between those factors influencing a shift to 
a B2B scenario from those influencing a shift to a B2C scenario.  As a consequence, 
it comes as no surprise that the vast majority of e-commerce trade is currently B2B with 
very little development of radically new ‘internet’ goods and services.  The estimated 
logit model is statistically respectable and conforms to a number of intuitive 
expectations. Given the fixed mark-up, providers will happily adjust to a 
demonstrable demand for their design and price combinations.  Hence the key to 
succession is the replicator dynamics and the utility of the targeted user group.  A 
full succession tends to occur if a new Type Two provider can quickly generate a 
design and price combination that will make its targeted Type Two user better-off 
than the current dominant Type One provider-user alliance.  This highlights the co-
evolutionary interaction between the applications of providers and user preferences 
that drive emergent market structures.  A necessary condition for an IS succession in 
this model is new market entrants, offering previously unavailable IS performance 
characteristics, and a new user group that is willing to experiment with these new 
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characteristics.  It therefore comes as no surprise that the vast majority of e-commerce 
trade is currently B2B with very little development of radically new B2C goods and 
services. 
Four explanatory variables have been explored in the paper: the new characteristics 
offered by new IS technology systems, improved performance in one or more 
characteristics commonly offered by both new and old IS technology designs, 
differential production costs, and time.  In the estimated logit model, the availability of 
new IS application characteristics has a higher significance than the ability to offer 
improved performances over existing application characteristics.  Given diminishing 
marginal utility over the entire characteristic space, the initial gain arising from 
consumption of a new characteristic is likely to be greater than that arising though an 
incremental improvement of an existing characteristic.  This issue is not considered in 
the Shy model.  Indeed, as far as we are aware, the issue has not been considered by 
previous formal models.  Neither does the Shy model consider the likely implications of 
relative production costs.  Interestingly, costs do not appear as a significant factor in he 
estimated full succession logit model.  It may well be that relative costs prove to be a 
key factor in partial successions, where new IS technology providers are selling to 
established Type One user groups.  This is exactly the driver which appears to be 
driving the bulk of e-commerce transactions.  As a consequence, it comes as no surprise 
that the vast majority of e-commerce trade is currently B2B with very little 
development of radically new ‘internet’ goods and services. 
The estimated model also considers time as a possible explanatory variable.  By varying 
T1 one can alter the time allowed for a new IS technology to become established in a 
market niche.  Time T1 was found to be the second most important explanatory 
variable in the estimated logit model.  Finally, the results generated by the simulation 
model support a number of aspects of Shy’s earlier analysis of technological 
successions.  Notably, it highlights the importance of a co-existence of new 
technological products, championed by new market entrants, and one or more user 
groups that are willing to experiment with these new products.  Additionally, it 
supports Shy’s (previously untested) hypothesis that technological successions can 
occur in the presence of heterogeneous user preferences.  
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To conclude, the simulation model developed in this paper complements and 
extends, Shy’s analysis of technological successions, focussing on a number of 
potentially important variables not considered in that earlier work.  The current 
analysis represents a first effort in an ongoing research programme that seeks to re-
open the research agenda on technological successions, and to frame the discussion 
in meaningful way, through the development of agent-based models that can assist in 
the analysis of this complex phenomenon.  
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